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Pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Appellant replies to Respondent's Brief as follows: 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
In their brief, Respondents continue in their position 
taken at trial that the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase (hereinafter the "Agreement"), admittedly entered 
into by the parties was too vague, ambiguous and uncertain to 
be capable of specific performance. This Court, subsequent 
to submission of Appellant's Brief, has rendered an opinion 
reaffirming the applicable law and establishing that an Agree-
ment of the type at issue is enforceable. 
POINT I 
AN AGREEMENT IS NOT FATALLY VAGUE AND UNCERTAIN IF THERE IS 
A METHOD OF ESTABLISHING ITS TERMS. 
In Ferris ~· Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979), this 
Court on April 25, 1979, held that if the Trial Court has 
based its ruling upon a misapplication or misunderstanding of 
law and a correct one might have resulted in a different 
ruling, the party adversly affected is entitled to have the 
error corrected. Id. at 859. The Court further held and re-
affirmed the proposition that parties are obligated to act in 
good faith to.perform in accordance with an agreement's 
expressed intent and that an agreement is not fatally vague 
if there exists a formula for or method of fixing its terms. 
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We have no disagreement with the general pro-
position that a contract will not be specifically 
enforced unless the obligations of the parties are 
'set forth with sufficient definiteness that it 
can be performed.' But to be considered therewith 
is the further proposition that the parties to a 
contract are obliged to proceed in good faith to 
cooperate in performing the contract in accordance 
with its expressed intent. A contract is not 
fatally defective as to price if there if an agree-
ment as to some formula or method for fixing it. 
Id. at 859. 
Ferris was an eviction action commenced by the Plain-
tiff to evict the Defendant from possession of real property. 
The Trial Court found that Defendant was in possession under 
an oral contract to purchase which was not sufficiently 
definite for enforcement. Plaintiff had purchased the prop-
erty at Defendant's request because Defendant needed someone 
to finance it for her, and Plaintiff had orally agreed to 
subsequently sell to Defendant for a specified price "plus a 
fair commission." The oral agreement did not specify the 
time for payment of the purchase price. 
This Court held that neither failure to specify the 
amount of commission nor the time for payment rendered the 
agreement fatally defective. The rationale of Ferris was that 
the doctrine of reasonableness is a standard by which both 
the amount of commission and time for payment of the purchase 
price could be ascertained, enabling the oral agreement to 
be specifically enforced. 
In the instant case, the Trial Court found the terms 
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referring to the property description and terms for payment 
to have been fatally vague, notwithstanding that the Agree-
ment clearly stated that the property was to be purchased for 
a specified price. Yet as in Ferris, supra, there existed 
methods and standards for determining the intent of the Agree-
ment with respect to these terms which the Trial Court should 
have applied. 
A. Property Description 
Respondents offered no evidence at trial that they 
owned other property in the vicinity of the "corner of 
Hillview and Ninth East" in Salt Lake City, Utah, which was 
the description in the Agreement. Respondents acknowledged 
they owned three lots in that vicinity and that they had agreed 
to sell all three to different purchasers, one of which was 
to be sold to Appellant. Respondents were to determine which 
lots were to be sold to each of the three purchasers. Res-
pendent Michael Alvey testified as follows: 
Q Well, you would agree with me, would you not, 
that whoever took which particular lot, C. Howard Alvey 
& Sons agreed to sell all three lots, did they not? 
A Yes 
Q You would have to arrive at whether or not one 
party was going to take Lot 1, 2 or 3, or vice versa, 
is that correct? 
A Yes 
(R. 96). Furthermore, prior to any attempted closing of 
Appellant's purchase, Respondents had determined that the 
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other two lots would go to the other two buyers and had 
closed the purchase of them by the other two buyers. This 
left only one lot applicable to Appellant's purchase, which 
lot he was willing to and desired to take [R. 96-97). 
Thus, Respondents were to select the lot and fourplex 
to be purchased by Appellant from three contiguous lots they 
owned. They, in fact, did select which lot of the three that 
Appellant was to receive by having designated and conveyed 
two of those lots to the other two buyers. This standard of 
determining the property to be sold has previously been approved 
by this Court in quoting with approval the Kansas Supreme Court 
in Peckham v. Lane, 106 P. 464, 466 (Kansas 1910). 
No reason is apparrent why a person may not make a 
valid contract that he will sell to another one of 
several pieces of real estate of which he is the 
owner, to be selected by himself. When an agreement 
to that effect is written out and signed, it is a 
complete contract, all of the terms of which are 
expressed in writing. The owner agrees that he will 
first make the selection and then make the conveyance 
If he refuses to do either, a court may compel him 
to do both. But he cannot avoid the obligation 
to which he has committed himself in writing, merely 
by refusing to act at all. 
Calder v. Third Judicial District Court, 273 P.2d 168, 170 
(Utah 1954). 
B. Terms for Payment 
With respect to payment of the balance of the purchase 
price over and above the $500.00 earnest money paid, the Agree-
ment provided "terms to be arranged." [PLS Exh. 1.). The 
intent of such terms of the Agreement, as shown by testimony 
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at trial, was that Appellant would pay the balance in cash 
at closing. Even if that had not been the case, however, 
application of the reasonableness standard renders this lan-
guage certain. 
Appellant testified that the balance of the purchase 
price was to have been paid in cash at closing which amount 
was to have been acquired through financing [R. 57-59). 
Appellant had immediately made application with Zions First 
National Bank for financing [R. 58, 104] and was a qualified 
borrower for the amount needed [R. 58, 102-103]. In fact, 
Respondents obtained their construction loan from Zions First 
National Bank to build the fourplex on Appellant's lot on the 
basis of Appellant being a pre-approved qualified buyer of 
the property [R. 101-104]. Respondent's real estate agent, 
who prepared the Agreement and arranged for sale, understood 
the meaning of such language to be that Appellant would arrange 
financing and pay the balance in cash at closing [R. 121, 122]. 
Respondents were informed by such agent and understood that 
Appellant was to obtain financing and pay cash at closing 
[R. 121-123]. Respondents did not object to such arrangement 
[R. 123]. Respondents presented no testimony that "terms to 
be arranged" meant something different from the foregoing under-
standing thereof, or that Respondents had at any time before 
trial asserted that the words "terms to be arranged" ment some-
thing other than Respondent's real estate agent understood 
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and explained them. 
Respondents reliance in their belief on the fact that 
financing proceeds were never actually obtained by Appellant is 
immaterial. Since Respondents refused to close the transaction, 
there was no need to close the financing. 
The Trial Court based its ruling on a misunderstanding 
or misapplication of the law. The Trial Court failed to apply 
equitable considerations which upon proper application to the 
testimony adduced at trial clearly and unambiguously proves 
the intent of the Agreement and all parties thereto with respect 
to identity of the property and payment therefor. In addition, 
the Ferris rationale requires the Respondents to have acted in 
good faith. Upon taking into account the testimony adduced at 
trial, payment of cash at closing, as Appellant desired to do, 
was reasonable. If Appellant (contrary to all testimony on 
this subject) had not been able to pay cash at closing then 
Respondents would have been relieved from conveying the property 
and would have had their own remedies under the Agreement. There 
fore, to permit a seller of property to willfully abandon the 
terms of a contract prior to the date on which the buyer must 
perform is to ignore the "good faith" rationale of Ferris. The 
"good faith" rationale of Ferris clearly sustains the Appellant'' 
ownership of the subject property. 
CONCLUSION 
When applying equitable standards approved and required 
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by this Court, the Agreement was not vague, ambiguous or 
uncertain, and it should be specifically enforced. Applica-
tion of the Ferris rationale to the facts of this case clearly 
establishes all terms of the Agreement; namely, (1) Respondents 
agreed to sell a lot and fourplex to Appellant for a specific 
price; (2) Respondents designated which lot and fourplex was 
to be sold to Appellant by having conveyed to others the other 
two of three lots agreed to be sold under similar agreements; 
(3) Respondents accepted Appellants earnest money; (4) 
Respondents obtained a construction loan on the lot and four-
plex on the basis of Appellant being a pre-approved buyer of 
the same; and (5) Respondents required Appellant to deposit 
$13,500.00 in escrow as evidence he could complete the purchase. 
DATED September ~' 1979 
Respectfully Submitted: 
PARSONS & CROWTHER 
By~~~ 
;/Parsons 
jBy -11~ )/ ~ 
Thomas N. Crowther 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Two copies of the foregoing Reply Brief were served 
upon Respondents by mailing the same, postage prepaid, to their 
attorney, Harold A. Hintze, at 2000 Beneficial Life Tower, 36 
South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this ~~ay 
of September, 1979. 
c~ 
Thomas N. Crowther 
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